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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-2242 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RODNEY MURRAY 
a/k/a Rodney Miller, 
        Appellant 
__________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 02-cr-00172-32) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 23, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, FISHER and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  July 14, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Rodney Murray, after pleading guilty to controlled substance violations, 
was sentenced in September, 2004 in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania to a term of imprisonment of 250 months and eight years of 
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supervised release.  Just over six years later, on January 24, 2011, Murray filed a petition 
for a writ of mandamus, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, in the sentencing court against two United 
States Department of Justice employees.  Murray alleged that “Special Agent 
Vandenwigen” and Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) lieutenant T.K. Lewis entered into a 
contract with him for his cooperation in an investigation of a certain BOP correctional 
officer who was suspected of selling cigarettes and cellular telephones, and a certain BOP 
recreation specialist who was suspected of prostitution.  In exchange for Murray’s 
cooperation, the agents allegedly agreed to contact the United States Attorney in 
Philadelphia, in order to get a motion filed on Murray’s behalf for a reduced sentence.  
Murray contended that, after he risked his life by wearing a wire, Vandenwigen and 
Lewis reneged on the contract and did not help him get his sentence reduced.  Murray 
asked the District Court to order Vandenwigen and Lewis to honor the contract by 
contacting the prosecutor. 
In an order entered on March 25, 2011, the District Court, who was also the 
sentencing judge, denied mandamus relief without prejudice, and also denied Murray’s 
implied request for appointment of counsel.  The court reasoned that there was no 
cooperation agreement, and Murray had not, in the alternative, made the required 
showing under Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992).  Therefore, Murray had not 
shown a clear and indisputable right to the writ. 
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Murray appealed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
  Our Clerk 
advised Murray that the appeal was subject to summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to submit argument in writing, but he has not done 
so. 
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We review 
a District Court’s mandamus decision for an abuse of discretion, except that we review 
non-discretionary elements of the decision de novo.  See Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 
929 (3d Cir. 1996).  A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in 
extraordinary situations.  See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  
To justify the use of this extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and 
indisputable right to the writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief 
desired.  See Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).  In addition, 
“the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is 
                                              
1
 We conclude that this case is distinguishable from Borelli v. City of Reading, 
532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  Although the District Court’s dismissal was 
without prejudice, a district court lacks authority to modify a sentence for substantial 
assistance in the absence of an agreement or where the required showing under Wade has 
not been made, see United States v. Higgins, 967, F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1992).  Thus, 
Murray can do nothing to cure his petition, making the order final and appealable, cf. 
Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1461 n.6. 
(3d Cir. 1994) (where District Court dismisses case based on justiciability, plaintiffs can 
do nothing to cure their complaint). 
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appropriate under the circumstances.”  In re: Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 
399 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations removed). 
Murray did not show a clear and indisputable right to the writ.  See Haines, 975 
F.2d at 89.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) provides for the reduction of a 
defendant’s criminal sentence if the defendant provides “substantial assistance in 
investigating or prosecuting another person.”  But, the United States Supreme Court held 
in Wade, 504 U.S. 181, that, where there is no agreement, the prosecutor’s decision not to 
file a motion for a reduction in sentence based on substantial assistance is reviewable 
only where the refusal is based on unconstitutional grounds, such as his race or religion.  
See id. at 185-86.  Cf. United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(acknowledging Wade’s holding that, absent a plea agreement, prosecutor has “almost 
unreviewable discretion over whether to file a substantial assistance motion”).  Moreover, 
the defendant under Wade must make a “substantial threshold showing” of impropriety in 
the government’s refusal to seek a sentence reduction.  Id. at 185.  “[A] claim that a 
defendant merely provided substantial assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy 
or even discovery or an evidentiary hearing.”  Id. at 186.  Murray did not allege 
unconstitutional grounds for the government’s refusal to file a motion in his case, let 
alone make “a substantial threshold showing” thereof.  He alleged only that he gave 
assistance at great personal expense, but this is not sufficient under Wade, and certainly 
does not warrant a writ of mandamus. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
denying mandamus relief and Murray’s request for appointment of counsel. 
